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ABSTRACT
The shipping market is an economic derivative of glob-
al production and trade, being precariously subject of their 
cyclic changes, depressions and expansions. This paper 
analyses the condition of global container shipping market, 
caused by long-lasting economic and financial crisis that be-
gun in 2008, but is still much visible within the container 
industry, particularly through overcapacity and low freight 
rates. It also deals with major changes of maritime contain-
er carrier’s management strategies, development and appli-
cation of advanced transportation, technological, technical, 
economical, organizational and commercial measures in 
order to adapt and cope with new business environment. 
Finally, an attempt is made to forecast the market, potential 
difficulties and to propose problem-solving measures.
KEY WORDS
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1. INTRODUCTION
Container shipping is an integral part of the global-
ization process as well as an important factor of sus-
tained economic development. During the year 2016, 
there were 10.3 billion tons shipped out by sea, which 
is 80% of the complete world’s trade [1]. During the 
same year, the share of goods carried by containers 
reached 1.72 billion tons. World was never better 
connected and dependent on the sea trade as today. 
Being a derivative of the World’s economy, container 
shipping is vulnerable to external factors, such as vol-
ume of international trade, political situation, financial 
trends, technological development and international 
and national legislation. All of those factors directly or 
indirectly influence the demand for transportation. Fi-
nancial crisis, commenced in 2008, rapidly projected 
from financial into the industrial sector and as a re-
sult international trade dropped by 14.4% for the first 
time since 1982. World GDP plunged by 2.2% dragging 
down the transportation demand and collapsing the 
freight rates. As a result, dynamics and mechanism 
within shipping industry were gravely disrupted creat-
ing huge overcapacity and causing freight rates to drop 
to their historical minimums [1].
Under such business environment, with their very 
existence on the market being threatened, companies 
had to adapt and develop effective strategies and 
measures to cope with new, changed circumstances. 
Taking all above into consideration, the aim is to re-
view the shift of strategies and present the measures 
taken so far to consolidate the container shipping, as 
well as to give a forecast of the future market condi-
tion.
2. ROAD TO CRISIS
A favourable economic and technological situation 
at the end of 20th century has greatly accelerated the 
containerization and container shipping. The newly es-
tablished global production system with strategically 
worldwide spread resources and cheap workforce, de-
manded an affordable and reliable logistic chain. Con-
tainerization, as an inter-modal transport of high effi-
ciency, reliability and flexibility has been a logical and 
cost-effective answer to demands of modern produc-
tion and trade functions. The technological develop-
ments in shipbuilding, port terminals and port equip-
ment, as well as political integrations in Europe, world 
trade agreements, tariff regulations, easier access to 
financial loans as direct result of communications and 
IT support improvements were the fundamental fac-
tors of unhindered development of international econ-
omy, trade and, naturally, container shipping.
Increased volume of international trade and steady 
growth of GDP for the period from 1990 onwards, have 
expanded the containerized traffic from 28.7 million 
TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit is the capacity unit 
in inter-modal container shipping, related to standard 
ISO container with dimensions: 6.1m x 2.44m x2.59m 
and volume of 38.5 m³) to 152 million TEU [1]. Such 
steep increase of traffic caused discrepancy of supply 
and demand on the container shipping market, on 
the demand side. Due to easy loan access and high 
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three main drivers to trade imbalances: low labour 
cost, particularly in the basic and consumer industry, 
public debt and impairment loss of capital assets and 
real estate and direct financial investments in low pro-
duction cost regions as well as transfer of knowledge 
and technology [2].      
As a direct result of crisis of financial crash and pro-
duction and trade decline, the overcapacity and short 
demand caused radical fall of the freight rates that led 
into insolvencies, laying up the vessels, losses and in 
some cases bankruptcies.
3. CRISIS IMPACT ON CONTAINER SHIPPING
 The connection between financial and insurance 
houses and shipping carriers is a close-knit symbiosis. 
Shipping is a very capital-intensive industry due to high 
value of the ships and such relations are natural and 
essential. However, a long-standing practice of passive 
investment and insurance, due to extraordinary return 
of investment has been replaced by a more active role 
and even direct operational control in some cases. The 
world economic crisis started in the financial sector in 
2007 and culminated in autumn 2008 ended up in the 
collapse of production, investment and international 
trade. Such a dramatic recession has caused steep 
drop of demand for transportation, spreading the cri-
sis into shipping.
3.1 Consequences 
The consequences to container shipping, directly 
emerged from the onset of crisis, could be classified 
into several groups [3];
 – Overcapacity of cargo space,
 – Freight rates downfall,
return of investments the operators started to order 
new tonnage. These new building, thanks to techno-
logical advancements got bigger and more efficient in 
both cargo-carrying capacity and fuel economy, further 
reducing the expenses incurred through its normal 
business operations. These expenses are called op-
erating expenses and are often abbreviated as OPEX. 
However, the usual new building delivery time is two 
to three years, so the tonnage ordered during the ex-
pansion years was scheduled for delivery only after the 
onset of 2008 crisis or even later. By the beginning 
of 2009, the total number of container ships reached 
4,693 with cumulative cargo capacity of 12.1 million 
TEU [1]. Table 1 shows the growth rate of demand and 
supply and its disproportion upon the beginning of the 
crisis. 
It is clearly visible from Table 1 that demand for 
transportation capacity has been reduced from double 
digits growth up to 2007, to a single digit or even went 
to negative values during the peak of the economic 
crisis in 2009. At the same time shipyards continued 
to deliver new tonnage. The result was an overcapacity 
and drop of freight rates and even today, we can still 
feel its consequences.
Container shipping is mirroring the cyclic nature 
of the economy and finance. In general, crisis begins 
with stagnation of production and trade, followed by 
industrial recession and finally depression. Such order 
of crisis onset may provide indications and warnings 
for shipping companies to commence actions and pro-
cedures to mitigate the effects. However, the 2008 
crisis began in the financial sector and without clear 
insight in the financial market and macroeconomic 
indications of trade imbalances, the trend of order-
ing new tonnage just kept going on and on. There are 
Table 1 – Demand and supply growth rate for container space (in %) [1]
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Demand 13.4 10.6 11.2 10.9 4.4 -9.7 12.8 7.2 3.2 5.0 6.0 6.5
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Figure 1 – New-building deliveries by year and by size from 2005 to 2016, with 2017 and 2018 forecast [4]
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Due to overcapacity and reduced international pro-
duction and trade, all the major trade routes have ex-
perienced a drop of the freight rates. Table 2 describes 
the freight rates on the major east – west trade route 
from 2009 to 2015;
The Far East – Europe is a major trade route mir-
roring the condition of container shipping. With such 
extreme drops and so low freight rates, as shown in 
Table 2, not only the profitability, but further exploita-
tion of the vessel came into question. The ripple ef-
fects can be felt, even now with freight rates in average 
declining ever since 2009. 
The other segment of container shipping industry – 
Chartering, was deeply affected by the crisis. Large op-
erators, in order to maintain the liquidity of the owned 
fleet had to drastically reduce the existing charter 
rates to third-party ships being employed on their ma-
jor routes, either on Time or Voyage charters. In many 
instances, even completely cancelling the contracts. 
Fluctuation and decline of charter rates in the period 
2000 - 2016 is presented in Figure 2;
Figure 2 shows that, after the constant growth 
since 1Q of 2002, there was steep decline of charter 
rates in the 4Q of 2008 with very little activities for 
 – Charter rates reduction and charters cancellation,
 – Freight rate wars,
 – Job losses, and
 – Debts, financial losses and bankruptcies and com-
plete ceasing of the shipping activity.
Ships ordered prior to the 2008 crisis were due 
for delivery at its peak and for the couple of following 
years, increasing the complexity of the already fragile 
international market. The reduced trade has further 
created the overcapacity and brought cargo space de-
mands to its minimums. Figure 1 shows the new-build-
ing deliveries by year and by size from 2005 to 2016, 
with 2017 and 2018 forecast;
The large number of Very and Ultra large ships 
(over 13,000 TEU) due to be delivered in 2017 and 
2018, as shown in Figure 1 is expected to drive the con-
tainership fleet growth this and the next year. Some 
78% of tonnage belongs to ships over 10,000 TEUs. 
The relatively high fleet growth rate for 2017 of over 
one million TEUs added, compared to 2016 when 0.93 
million TEUs were delivered will prolong the overcapac-
ity and further delay recovery on the container ship-
ping market [4].
Table 2 – Freight markets 2009–2015 on the Far East – Europe Trade Route [1]
Freight markets 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Far East – Europe (Dollars per TEU)
Shanghai – Northern Europe 1,395 1,789 881 1,353 1,084 1,161 629
Percentage change 28.24 -50.75 53.58 -19.88 7.10 -45.82
Shanghai – Mediterranean 1,397 1,739 973 1,336 1,151 1,253 739
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Figure 2 – Quarterly charter rates 2000-2016 [5]
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In the period from 2000 until 2008, USD has suf-
fered a significant depreciation, particularly if com-
pared to euro. The shipping market is traditionally 
connected to USD, since the freight and charter rates 
are formed and charged in that currency. Also, low dol-
lar value has negatively affected the financial market, 
halting further investments [9].
4. MEASURES AND STRATEGIES TO COPE 
WITH THE CRISIS
Though last to feel the crisis within the shipping 
industry, container shipping was hit the hardest. The 
revenues for the main operators, for the first quarter 
of 2009 plunged by 35%, when compared to the same 
period in 2008 or estimated 45 billion USD [10]. The 
immediate and radical actions had to be taken for the 
sake of survival. Most traditional first aid measure in 
the times of financial difficulties is the reduction in ca-
pacity.
4.1 Capacity consolidation  
The world container fleet capacity grew by 103% 
from 2000 to 2007 (5,150,000 – 10,467,000 TEU) 
[11]. With the tonnage ordered before 2008 and due 
for delivery, urgent reorganization of capacity was 
necessary to remain in business. Due to its nature 
new-building contracts cancellation or delays are very 
expensive and subject to high penalties as well as long 
negotiations. Therefore, the measures with immediate 
effect were the most traditional ones:
 – Lay-ups,
 – Selling and scrapping,
 – Reducing the sailing speed, and 
 – Blank sailing
Laying up the vessels in the time of crisis is a well-
known and time-proven consolidation measure. By es-
timates, during 2009 there was a lay-up of 10 – 15% 
of container tonnage. Total laid up capacity reached 
1,400,000 TEU [1].
Additionally, due to the existing overcapacity, the 
secondhand ships market almost came to a halt be-
cause of very low demand. Before the crisis, the usual 
age of ships sent to the scrapyard was over 40 years. 
During 2009 the scrapped container capacity was 
364,300 TEU, compared to 2008’s 99,900 TEU. How-
ever, the average age of the ships sent for demolition 
was 27 years only. Even such an extreme measure re-
sulted in total reduction of fleet capacity by 3% [1].
The speed of a vessel has a dramatic impact on 
the fuel consumption because the speed is related 
to the propulsive power required by approximately a 
third or fourth power relationship. Likewise, sailing at 
90 percent of the design speed requires only 75 per-
cent of the power. The corresponding reduction in to-
tal fuel consumption is offset a bit by the longer time 
almost a year. At the end of 2009, 572 ships with total 
capacity of 1,520,000 TEU had to be laid up. However, 
70% of them were previously chartered vessels. It is 
definite that container shipping companies, special-
ized in chartering vessels to main operators, suffered 
the hardest. It is also clear from the graph that char-
ter rates had never recovered the previous values ever 
since.
During the times of recession, the largest opera-
tors, with capital reserves, were able to offer their 
customers lower rates, even below liquidity, in order to 
remain on the market and push out the other, weaker 
operators. Such practices often led to so-called “freight 
wars” and that may further create additional debts, 
bankruptcies and in some cases complete ceasing 
of any shipping activity. By some estimations, during 
the crisis, complete container shipping has suffered 
a loss of 20 billion USD. Further low profit and credit 
insolvencies created at the end of 2009 a debt to com-
mercial banks of up to 500 billion USD [6]. These, not 
restructured by banks or governments had to cease 
their shipping activities or file for bankruptcy.
Finally, as a result of laying up the vessels, expens-
es consolidation, bankruptcies, salaries reduction and 
laying up the personnel were common occurrences, 
which added the burden to national economies and 
delayed the recovery process. 
3.2 Aggravating circumstances
Further to serious overcapacity, due to reduced 
demand for the container space, the following circum-
stances have aggravated the already difficult situation:
 – Increased price of marine fuel,
 – Self-imposed financial discipline, and 
 – Depreciation of USD value.
After the decades of low oil price (18-20 USD/
Barrel), beginning of 21st century brings the steep in-
crease of fuel prices, so that 2008 ends with USD 94.1 
per barrel with rising trend until 2012 [7]. The price of 
fuel with crew cost is the major part of OPEX. Under 
the regime of low freight rates, any further expense re-
ducing profitability, increasing the final price of trans-
portation service eventually reduced even more the 
competitiveness of the operator on the market.
During the years of crisis, out of 500 billion USD 
of debt owned by container shipping companies, 40 
international banks held 80% of total debt of which 
just the leading 12 banks held approximately 50% of 
the total debt. In order to protect the remaining assets 
and reserves, the major banks, involved in container 
shipping started to withdraw from the shipping market. 
Top ten banks reduced their loans in 2008 by half [6]. 
Such lack of financial investment has further deterio-
rated the situation on the container shipping market. 
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were instant and as shown in Figure 3, with immediate 
reduction of operational expenses upon the onset of 
2008 crisis has stopped the continuous growth that 
characterized the previous decade and held them at 
almost the same level since then.
4.3 Economy of scale
The capacity consolidation measures have re-
moved from the marked obsolete and energy-inef-
ficient ships. At the same time, shipyards started to 
deliver modern, efficient vessels of large capacity (up 
to 18,000 TEU), operated by smaller crew and creating 
the condition to reap the benefits of the economy of 
scale laws in container shipping. 
Economy of scale and scope are not something new 
to container shipping industry. However, due to the 
lack of financial support, the activities related to econ-
omy of scope (vertical and horizontal integration, fleet 
diversification, etc.) had to be reduced to minimum or 
to completely cease. The benefits of the economy of 
scale were realized through two levels of activities and 
were quickly seized by opportunistic managements. 
On the production level, the answer was to increase 
the vessel size, so the first decade of 21st century 
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Figure 4 – Daily operating cost per TEU [12]
spent to complete the voyage. So, by slowing down by 
10 percent the vessel can save about 20 percent in 
fuel for a given voyage. This significant savings make 
it easy to understand why so-called “Slow Steaming”, 
a relatively new strategy, compared to the above two 
traditional measures was developed. Besides directly 
reducing the fuel expenses, this measure creates arti-
ficially tonnage demand by simply prolonging the sea 
voyage time. With traditional weekly port calls on re-
spective service lines, the prolongation of sea voyage 
from four to six weeks, opens an opportunity to add 
additional two ships, hence reducing present overca-
pacity. Together with the implicated freight raise, due 
to increased transportation space demand it is also an 
environmental friendly measure since less consump-
tion means less air polluting emissions [8].
Blank sailing is also a new measure, when one of 
the ships on a given line is halted for the duration of 
one week or more. Such practice artificially generates 
demand for the container capacity and results in high-
er freights.
4.2 Optimization and operating expenses 
reduction  
Together with capacity consolidation, OPEX optimi-
zation and reduction of day-to-day operating costs is 
another traditional immediate measure with immedi-
ate effect. The main operational expenses are:
 – Fuel and lubricants,
 – Crew expenses,
 – Maintenance, spares, consumables, etc.
Fuel and lubricants represent on average 55% of 
OPEX. Together with Slow Steaming, high attention was 
given to development of energy efficiency procedures 
and their application, as well as to personnel training.
An immediate measure, with prompt results, is the 
reduction of the number of crew on board the vessel 
to minimum allowed by Class and Flag authorities. 
Though shipping operators were fully aware that such 
measures, during the long-term reduce the level of ser-
vice quality, the severity of the crisis presented such a 
measure as an acceptable risk.
For the duration of crisis, in most cases the level of 
maintenance was reduced to bare minimum to keep 
the vessels safe and seaworthy. The same applies to 
the supply of spare parts and consumables.
Complete shipping industry has undertaken strict 
measures to control OPEX, but container shipping, 
being hit the worst, had the best results, as shown in 
Figure 3.
Besides very strict OPEX control, the varieties of 
organizational and business optimization measures 
were undertaken. Those measures were better line 
and route planning, return to core business and cease 
of horizontal integration processes, as well as reduc-
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Figure 3 – Trends of operating costs indices from 2000 to 
2014 [10]
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finally remove the competitors and create favourable 
freight rates for themselves [16]. Today, top 15 com-
panies in container shipping are as shown in Table 3.
5. FORECASTS AND EXPECTATIONS FOR 
THE FUTURE
In order to cope with the crisis and adapt to the 
new business environment, container shipping had to 
change. Those who had better reserves or any access 
to financial markets succeeded in consolidating their 
operations by utilizing new technological or organiza-
tional assets and placed themselves into better com-
petitive position. The importance of proper analysis of 
market situation and operational planning is of utmost 
importance since even at the end of 2016 idle capac-
ity was 1,419,649 TEU [17]. Carefully observing and 
analysing the market fluctuation, it is possible to iso-
late below the key factors that will shape the demand 
trends on the container shipping market [18]:
 – Insufficient demand for container capacity,
 – Overcapacity,
 – Record low prices of marine fuel,
 – Global fluctuation of the market,
 – Emerging markets,
 – Limitation for further growth of containerization 
processes,
 – Increased capacity and improved technology of 
container terminals,
 – Sustainable development and environment aware-
ness, and
 – New technologies, operational transparency and 
customer support.
Despite the fact that in the last two years the world 
GDP has steadily risen by 2.5%, it was eventually be-
low estimations. However, it is still an indication of 
slow recovery. At the same time, Chinese economic 
growth has slowed down and with China being the ma-
jor generator of seaborne transportation on all the ma-
jor trade routes, the result was a steady reduction of 
demand and insufficient utilization of the world fleet’s 
20,265,925 TEU, as tallied on 31st December 2016 
[17].
Figure 4 indicates the reduction of operating costs 
by increasing the ship’s size. The difference between 
daily expenses among different classes of container 
ships grow much slower than their capacity rate. For 
example, fuel consumption per day of 6,000 TEU ships, 
under the slow steaming regime is around 60 tons and 
for 18,000 around 120 tons while later vessels car-
ry three times more cargo [13]. The number of crew 
is almost the same, as well as the maintenance cost. 
Therefore, as shown in Graph 4, the cost for 18,000 
TEU vessels are half the cost of those of 6,000 TEU.
4.4 Integrations – conferences, alliances, 
mergers and acquisition      
On the company level, the solution was the cre-
ation of liner conferences, global strategic alliances 
(GSA) and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). For more 
of a century, the liner conferences were the way for the 
shipping companies to control the tariffs on certain 
routes, while keeping exclusive control of their own 
operations. However, the last decade has brought cre-
ation of global trade strategic alliances. The operators 
share the resources, assets, information and part of 
the operational control in order to increase the scope 
and volume of the business on global container mar-
ket. Such alliance enables great reduction of operat-
ing costs, controlling the risks, improving the reliability 
and efficiency of service, increasing the presence in 
port of calls and generally offering the higher level of 
service to customers [11B]. Today, most of the opera-
tors are grouped into GSAs. Major GSAs are 2M (APM 
Maersk Line and Mediterranean Shipping Co.), Ocean 
Alliance (CMA CGM Group, COSCO; UASC; Evergreen 
Line) and G6 (OOCL, Happag-Lloyd, MOL, NYK Line, 
Hyundai M.M.). However, it is almost certain that alli-
ances will get reshuffled in the near future [14]. 
Though not a new strategy, the last decade has 
brought a series of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
in container shipping market. The market itself is very 
competitive and all operators, particularly the major 
ones, tend to increase their assets in order to reach 
the critical capacity mass to reduce the operating ex-
penses, obtain larger degree of market flexibility and 
Table 3 – Top 15 container operators as of 27th January 2017 [15]
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adherence to positive international, national and clas-
sification regulations changed the face of modern con-
tainer shipping making it another link in the logistic 
chain, based upon the policy of sustainable develop-
ment [19].
Within the supply chain, all subjects from the 
manufacturer to the end user are highly motivated 
toward investments in the new technologies in order 
to increase the efficiency and productivity. The devel-
opment of communications and IT platforms enabled 
better transparency for establishing cooperation and 
developing higher level of service to the end user [20].
A myriad of factors are necessary to maintain the 
balance between demand and supply on the container 
shipping market, while at the same time keeping the 
profitability. In order to remain competitive and suc-
cessful on the international market, proper and time-
ly analysis of all the above factors, as well as further 
consolidation of cargo capacity, reduction of opera-
tional expenses, flexible and innovative line structure 
and vessel deployment, responsible and transparent 
freight rates, diversity and open-minded service pal-
ette, as well as wisely developed adaptive strategy are 
factors and activities to be carefully considered at all 
times.
6. CONCLUSION
Global economic crisis commenced in 2008 had 
the most serious impact among the container carriers 
and shock waves are still felt on the shipping market. 
A combination of low demand and steady delivery of 
newly ordered, large and modern ships, created over-
capacity. Freight, charter, ship scrappers and second-
hand market rates dropped below the profitability limit 
and all the companies experienced the difficulties to 
a larger or lesser extent. However, none was spared.
Throughout this paper the order of events has been 
presented that led to the above-mentioned crisis and 
the major shift of the strategies undertaken by the 
leading container shipping companies in order to cope 
with hostile business environment. Mostly, those ac-
tivities were concentrated in consolidation and cost 
control activities within the companies and toward 
the outside, large movements toward the mergers 
and takeovers in order to gain stronger positions on 
the market and establish the domination by the sheer 
force of capacity and service volume.
However, the following years will bring more con-
solidation, but not at the speed seen previously. There 
are still a number of attractive medium-sized carriers 
that have been left behind during the recent M&A and 
some may decide that catching up is too costly or un-
profitable in the medium term and decide to sell up to 
larger carriers. On the other side, the pool of potential 
buyers with sufficient financial resources is quite lim-
ited. Particularly, banks are less able and inclined to 
From the very onset of crisis, overcapacity is the 
major problem of the container shipping market. The 
imbalance between demand and supply, due to lower 
demand and steady delivery of the new tonnage is es-
timated to remain until 2019. Only in 2016, there were 
136 ships with capacity of 934,460 TEU delivered to 
the operators. The order book as of 31st December 
2016 was 413 ships with total capacity of 3,187,665 
TEU [17].
Ever since 2013, the trend of the declining price of 
crude oil (USD 40.68 per barrel for 2016) was a pal-
pable treat to delicate balance of the container market 
[7]. Some operators, in order to improve the service 
decided to seize the opportunity and increase the voy-
age speed, hence causing additional overcapacity and 
drop of the freight rates.
Political instability, wars, embargoes, etc. seriously 
influence trade flows by creating the fluctuations of the 
world market. Recent unrests in the Middle East, war 
in Ukraine and trade embargo on Russia, significantly 
reduced the cargo traffic, particularly on the North Eu-
ropean and Baltic routes.
In the meantime the new regions with significant 
demographic and industrial growth, for example Nige-
ria, with the present population of 174 mill and the ex-
pected in 2050 of 440 million, open the possibilities 
for potential growth of container industry.
In addition, the process of commodities contain-
erization has reached its plateau. There are seldom 
any commodities not being presently transported in 
containers. The main reasons were security, reliabil-
ity, cost efficiency and flexibility of transport. Today, 
for example, modern mega post-panamax vessel (> 
14,000 TEU) can carry more refrigerated cargo than 
conventional specialized reefer vessels, pushing those 
vessels out of the market. 
Due to the low operational intensity during the cri-
sis, many container terminal operators used this time 
for modernization and expansion of their terminals, 
preparing them for larger vessels of the latest design 
as well as the estimated increase of trade volume. 
Such surplus of cargo handling facilities increased the 
competition between terminals and placed the liners 
in a position to carefully study the benefits of choosing 
the exact terminal for their routes. It must be said that 
large operators, often within the process of vertical 
integration tend to take control of the key positioned 
terminal to secure uninterrupted cargo flow and ship 
schedules.
The recent years have brought a shift in the envi-
ronment protection awareness among the major line 
operators and shipping companies. Energy efficiency, 
use of renewable sources of energy, increased train-
ing of the ship and shore personnel, improvement in 
ships and engine designs, reduction of air pollution by 
exhaust gases, use of biodegradable and bio friend-
ly materials in building containers, as well as strict 
Jerebić V, Pavlin S. Global Economy Crisis and its Impact on Operational Container Carrier’s Strategy
194 Promet – Traffic&Transportation, Vol. 30, 2018, No. 2, 187-194
repec.org/article/spdjournl/v_3a64_3ay_3a2014_3ai
_3a2_3ap_3a5-13.htm [Accessed on February 2017].
[3] Samaras I, Papadopoulou EM. The Global Financial 
Crisis – The Effects on the Liner Shipping Industry and 
the Newly Adopted Leading Practices. Paper present-
ed at: 1st Olympus International Conference on Supply 
Chains (ICSC 2010), 1-2 Oct 2010, Katerini, Greece. 
Available from: http://www.teicm.gr [Accessed on Feb-
ruary 2017].
[4] Alphaliner Weekly Newsletter. Volume 27, Issue 04, 
January 2017. Available from: http://www.alphaliner.
com/ [Accessed on February 2017].
[5] Alphaliner Portal. Available from:  http://www.alphaliner.
com/liner2/research_files/liner_studies/nograph/Al-
phaliner-CharterRates.pdf [Accessed on February 2017].
[6] World Bank Global Economic Prospects 2010. Wash-
ington DC, USA: The World Bank Publication; 2010.
[7] Statista, The Statistical Portal. Available from: https://
www.statista.com/statistics/262858/change-in-
opec-crude-oil-prices-since-1960/ [Accessed on Feb-
ruary 2017].
[8] Bomboma K, Tshibuyi MC. The Financial and Econom-
ic Crisis, Its Impacts on the Shipping Industry, Lessons 
to Learn: The Container Market Analysis. Open Journal 
of Social Sciences. 2016;4(1): 38-44.
[9] Macro trends, The Statistical Financial Portal. Avail-
able from: http://www.macrotrends.net/1329/us-dol-
lar-index-historical-chart [Accessed on February 2017].
[10] The Financial and Economic crisis of 2008 – 2009 
and Developing Countries. UNCTAD, UN, New York, 
USA, Genève, Switzerland; December 2010.
[11] Greiner R, Moore Stephens LLP. Ship Operating Cost: 
Current and Future Trends. Available from: https://www.
opcostonline.com/#/ [Accessed on February 2017].
[12] Murray W. Economies of Scale in Container Ships 
Costs. North America’s Premier International Shipping 
Conference, March 2016, Stamford, Connecticut, USA. 
[13] Notteboom T, Carriou P. Fuel surcharge practices of 
container shipping lines: Is it about cost recovery or 
revenue making. Proceedings of the 2009 Internation-
al Association of Maritime Economists (IAME) Confer-
ence, June 2009, Copenhagen, Denmark.
[14] Panayides PM, Wiedmer R. Strategic Alliances in Con-
tainer Liner Shipping. Research in Transportation Eco-
nomics. Aug 2011;32: 25-38.
[15] Alphaliner Portal, Top 100. Available from:  http://
www.alphaliner.com [Accessed on February 2017].
[16] Alexandrou G, Gounopoulos D, Hardy MT. Mergers 
and Acquisitions in Shipping. Transportation Research 
Part E. Jan 2014;61: 212-234.
[17] Alphaliner Weekly Newsletter. Volume 2017, Issue 01, 
January 2017. Available from: http://www.alphaliner.
com/ [Accessed on February 2017].
[18] Damas P. 2016 Container Shipping outlook: Assessing 
the Fundamentals. TPM Conference, February/March 
2016, Long Beach, Ca. USA. Available from: http://
www.ciffa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Day-
1-Presentation-4c-Philip-Damas-DREWRY_Contain-
er-Shipping-Outlook.pdf [Accessed on February 2017].
[19] Rex C. Shipping Market Review. Copenhagen, Den-
mark: Danish Ship Finance; May 2017.
[20] DNV. Shipping 2020. Hovik, Norway: Det Norske Veri-
tas; Aug. 2012.
lend money and the borrowing costs are rising due to 
new regulations and self-imposed limitations. Howev-
er, despite the stringiest measurements, the forecasts 
warn that overcapacity will persist, despite reluctant 
investor’s climate at least until the year 2019.
Despite the grave consequences, there were also 
positive effects. Fleet capacity optimization, improve-
ment of operation efficiency, cost control and cost 
reduction, strengthening of information exchange, ad-
vances in environmental protection and sustainable 
development, debt restructuring, creation of global 
alliances, mergers and acquisitions and exploration of 
economy of scale have produced positive effects, thus 
enabling the prudent carriers to remain on container 
shipping market. Those are also the paths, most rec-
ommended for further research. Particularly the cost 
optimization techniques, digital transformation of 
shipping business and sustainable and renewable en-
ergy sources are the avenues that are most promising 
for the future.
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GLOBALNA EKONOMSKA KRIZA I OPERATIVNA 
STRATEGIJA KONTEJNERSKIH PRIJEVOZNIKA
SAŽETAK
Brodarsko tržište je ekonomska izvedenica proizvodnog i 
robnog tržišta i prema tome ovisno o cikličkim promjenama 
kao što su depresija i konjunktura. Rad analizira stanje na 
globalnom tržištu prijevoza kontejnera uzrokovano dugotra-
jnom ekonomskom i financijskom krizom, započetom 2008. 
godine koja je još uvijek uočljiva unutar kontejnerskog bro-
darstva i zrcali se prekomjernom tonažom i niskim vozari-
nama. Članak se bavi strateškim promjenama poslovanja 
pomorskih kontejnerskih prijevoznika, te osmišljavanjem i 
primjenom unaprijeđenih prometno-tehničkih, ekonomskih, 
organizacijskih i komercijalnih mjera s ciljem prilagodbe 
novo nastalim uvjetima poslovanja. Konačno, prikazuju se 
prognoze razvoja tržišta, te mogući problemi i mjere  nji-
hovog rješavanja.
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kontejnersko brodarstvo; utjecaj ekonomske krize; promjene 
poslovne strategije; konsolidacija; prognoza tržišta;
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